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ABSTRACT: Quantitative assessment is the most important means to identify hazard potential and manage 
risk for industrial process. The implement of quantitative assessment in early stage will help to develop 
inherently safer process, eliminating hazard and reduce the possibility of accidental chain-events and  
the magnitude of consequences. In this paper, after reviewing the presently available assessment method,  
we present the disadvantages of current technology in several aspects. Focusing on the main disadvantage of 
subjectivity in two aspects of index valuing and weighting, which is a serious barrier to measure the real level 
of process safety, we propose a quantitative assessment method integrated fuzzy inference and Analytic 
Hierarchy Process(AHP) to quantify safety and health hazards of chemical process route in preliminary design 
stage. The purpose of integrating fuzzy inference into it is to reduce the subjectivity of index valuing system. 
The fuzzy inference system is designed without medium variable in order to eliminate its negative effect  
on assessment result. Index weighting is determined by AHP more objectively based on the ordering of inherent 
safety guidewords. Finally, the proposed method is applied to assessment nine competing routes of acetic acid 
manufacture to present its improvement. 
 
 





Currently, the constantly increasing scale of industrial 
operations has more complicated issues and greater 
hazard potential, which exacerbate the magnitude of 
accidental consequence and domino effect. Safety 
assessment is an useful means to reveal the probability of 
accident risk by quantificationally obtaining the real 
safety level of chemical processes [1]. There are several 
safety assessment principles and methods recommended 




However, most of them have the disadvantage of the 
subjectivity in two aspects of index value and weighting, 
which is the main barrier to achieve the substantial safety 
assessment. In this work, we provide a safety assessment 
method integrated fuzzy inference and AHP, i.e. Inherent 
Preference Index(IPI), aiming to quantify the risk of 
chemical process in early stage. The subjectivity in index 
valuing system will be reduced by application of fuzzy 
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approach to eliminate uncertainty of issue. In addition, 
the subjectivity in index weighting is reduced by 
application of AHP, which is a multi-objective decision-
making method suitable to obtain index weighting vector 
objectively. In section 2, the current methods are 
reviewed to put forward the possible perspective of safety 
assessment firstly. Then the proposed method is 
discussed in detail in section 3. Finally, it is applied  
to acetic acid process routes screening to illustrate its 
availability. 
 
Review of quantitative assessment method 
Quantitative assessment is particularly suitable  
to implement inherent safety guidewords in the early 
stages of design. Some indexing methods are proposed 
for comparing alternatives of chemical process [2-4]. 
Edwards & Lawrence firstly develop a Prototype Index 
of Inherent Safety (PIIS) to analyze the inherent safety  
of process route [5]. It contains seven parameters—
Inventory, Temperature, Pressure, Yield, Toxicity, 
Flammability, and Explosiveness. Other methods  
are proposed to improve the assessment in several  
aspects, such as the magnitude of index, the subjectivity 
issue, assessment mode, scoring system, intelligence  
and how to be integrated to process design tools etc. [6-34].  
Quantitative assessment methods proposed earlier 
mainly extend the magnitude of index. Such as, Inherent 
Safety Index (ISI) is developed to classify process 
alternatives during preliminary process design[6,7]. 
Besides of the indices in PIIS, this method adds 
additionally the sub-indices of chemical interaction, heat 
of main reaction, heat of side reaction, and corrosiveness 
in chemical aspect and equipment safety and process 
structure safety in process aspect. Similarly, The I-safe  
is developed to distinguish alternative routes with closely 
inherent safety scores, which considers additionally five 
other supplementary indices, Hazardous Chemical Index (HCI), 
Hazardous Reaction Index (HRI), Total Chemical Index 
(TCI), Worst Chemical Index (WCI) and Worst Reaction 
Index (WRI)[9]. Generally, the potential hazards both  
in HSE (Health, Safety, Environment) properties of 
substances and process conditions should be considered 
during assessment process. The EHS and IBI method  
both involve safety, environment and health indices [16,18]. 
They treat safety assessment decision-making as a tradeoff 
of multiple objectives, i.e. safety, environment and  
health effects. 
The most current methods have subjectivity in index 
interval and weighting, which is the main barrier  
to measure the actual inherent safety level. Especially  
for the qualitative index (such as the inherent safety index 
in I2SI), the scale of index interval is subjective and 
indefinite, which led to different evaluation results for  
the same chemical process possibly [13,14]. In order to obtain 
the objective assessment result, the subjectivity in safety 
assessment should be reduced as far as possible. The two 
aspects of subjectivity (index value and index weighting) 
are described separately, because the former refers to 
single index and the latter refers to the relationship 
among indices. In the first aspect, it is divided into  
two parts, i.e. the scaling of index interval and the 
determination of index value. In safety assessment, index 
is based on parameter (e.g. temperature, flash point, etc.), 
the value of which is divided into several intervals(or 
stage) subjectively. Because the scaling of index interval 
is determined based on the engineering empirical data 
generally, the reduction in this aspect of subjectivity  
is limited. However, the determination of index value, 
namely scoring system, can be improved to achieve 
objectively. An example is Inherent Benign-ness 
Indicator (IBI), which standardizes index value by 
developing mathematical function for scoring system [18]. 
The Fuzzy Based Inherent Safety Index applies  
fuzzy theory to safety assessment, which reduces the 
uncertainty of index value[10-12]. The guideline of it is 
that index can partially belong to adjacent index intervals 
according to its membership function, which reduce  
the subjectivity of index scoring. However, the application 
case illustrates the assessment result will deviate from  
the fact situation when the number of medium variables 
increases in multistage fuzzy system. In the second, 
the index weighting should be considered because index has 
different contribution for the end index value (the total 
safety level) due to its impact. This aspect is hardly 
concerned by far. Gupta and Edwards propose a simple 
graphical method which discusses that just an overall 
index value can not indicate the contribution of different 
index. The individual index should be evaluated separately. 
The IBI uses Principal Components Analysis (PCA)  
to reduce dimensionality of variables, which identify  
the main impact factors to indicate the difference 
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of process routes[18]. This work proposes AHP  
to determinate the index weighting in safety assessment. 
According to the principle of protection layers, accident 
is caused by a chain effect that hazards in different layer’s 
follows a certain logical relationship. Accordingly, the index 
relationship should be considered during safety assessment 
process. Moreover, the logical relationship should conform 
to the practical hazardous scenario, which represent  
the practical hazardous behavior other than isolated index. 
It contributes to develop inherently safer process that 
improving intelligence of safety assessment and 
integrating it into process research and design technology 
[31-34]. The process synthesis strategy considered safety 
factor is proposed, applying to separation sequence and 
reaction structure synthesis [8,9]. The strategy generates 
alternatives by Genetic Algorithms (GA), then evaluating 
them by inherent safety indices, finally selecting the best 
alternative according to evaluation results. An intelligent 
Benign Design Tool (iBDT) is developed, which 
generates the alternatives by heuristics based on material, 
reaction conditions and process unit information. Their 
safety and environmental impacts are analyzed, assisting 
to make decision in the design stage of process [14]. The 
framework of Inherent Safety Index Module (ISID), 
Integrated Consequence Estimation Tool (ICET), and 
Integrated Probability Estimation Module (IPEM) in 
HYSYS is proposed to evaluate inherent safety, accident 
consequence and risk probability of chemical process 
based on the results of simulation [32]. The development 
of inherently safer process demands the support of 
intelligent inherent safety design technology and tools. 
 
QUANTITATIVE SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ASSESSMENT INTEGRATED FUZZY INFERENCE 
AND AHP 
Aim to reduce the disadvantage of subjectivity  
in index value and weighting, this section proposes  
an indexing method integrated fuzzy inference and AHP, 
which is suitable for screening inherently safer 
alternatives in early stage. The index value is determined 
by the established fuzzy inference system, which 
normalize the index value to [0,1]. The weightings of 
indices are obtained based on AHP. The weighting vector 
is calculated by establishing hierarchical model, forming 
comparison matrix and consistency test in order. The 
detailed assessment procedure is described as follow. 
Index selection 
The available process information is limited in early 
stage, the indices in this method mainly involve physical 
and chemical properties of substance, operation 
conditions and other aspects implemented inherent safety 
guidewords. The guidewords of inherent safety are 
minimization, substitution, moderation, simplification, 
following the ordering of importance[35,36]. 
The minimization guideword means minimizing  
the hazardous substance in process. The involved index  
is inventory. The higher inventory of hazardous substance 
has greater index value, representing the lower level of 
minimization guideword. As the inventory information  
is not available in early stage, this index is not considered here. 
The indices involved the substitution guideword are 
flammability, explosion, reactivity and reaction heat, 
toxicity. As these indices are inherent and impartible 
property of substance (or reaction), the alternative  
in which hazardous substance (highly flammable, explosive 
or reactive) is substituted by less hazardous one is 
inherently safer. Similarly, it is more inherently safe that 
the strict reaction is substituted by mild reaction.  
The related indices of the moderation guideword  
are temperature and pressure. The hazardous substance 
operated in moderate condition is inherently safer than in 
harsh condition. The operation conditions of alternatives 
are evaluated to measure the level of moderation 
guideword. 
The simplification guideword mainly refers to the 
complexity of reaction, such as multistep reaction and 
yield. The multistep reaction and lower yield will 
increase the complexity of process in the latter design 
stage. 
Based on available information, seven indices are 
considered in safety aspect, namely flammability, 
explosion, reactivity, reaction heat, yield, temperature 
and pressure. Three indices are considered in health 
aspect, i.e. Toxicity by Oral Ingestion(TOI), Toxicity by 
Respiratory(TR), Toxicity by Dermal Exposure(TDE). 
 
Determination of index value based on fuzzy inference 
Process safety is an uncertainty concept because  
it is not possible to be defined exactly. In other words, 
‘safety’ can not be strictly classified into the dichotomy 
safe or unsafe. Accordingly, process safety should not be 
modeled by a statistical approach since the uncertainty is not
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caused by randomness (described by statistical or 
probabilistic approach) but by fuzziness, vagueness and 
ambiguity. Fuzzy inference offers an alternative 
mathematical method where vague and imprecise 
concepts can be rigorously modeled where an element 
can belong to more than one fuzzy interval simultaneously. 
Inherent safety aims to eliminate the hazards rather 
than to control them. If hazard is present, the accident  
can occur if the protective layers fail in abnormal situation. 
In other words, the presence of the hazard makes  
the accident possible; if the hazard is eliminated, the accident 
can not occur. This idea is equivalent to the relation 
between probability and possibility: if an event is to be 
probable, it has to be possible. While the probability and 
possibility aim to solve different problems, they are 
described by different approach. Probability is associated 
with statistics, while possibility is modeled by fuzzy 
method.  
Although the fuzzy inference is a suitable method  
to solve uncertain problem, in practical application,  
the increase of the number of medium variable in multistage 
fuzzy system leads to that the assessment result no longer 
conforms to the practical scenario. Generally in a fuzzy 
inference system, two input variables will generate one 
output variable (medium variable), which is treated as 
input variable for the next fuzzy inference system. Since 
the medium variable has no physical meaning,  
the classification of its fuzzy intervals has no quantitative 
basis. Accordingly, the more medium variable means  
the more subjective factor during fuzzy inference process, 
leading to the assessment result deviating from  
the practice in the end. 
The proposed method develops the fuzzy inference 
system with one input variable and one output variable. 
The output variable do not participate in the next fuzzy 
inference system, which can overcome the shortcoming.  
Evaluation of index in this method is completed 
through three steps as follow. 
(1) Fuzzy intervals of index is determined according 
to its hazard hierarchic classification. 
Hazard hierarchic classification of index is based on 
ISI(Inherent Safety Index) proposed by Heikkila [7]. The 
fuzzy intervals of safety and health indices and their 
membership function parameters are showed in  
Tables 1 & 2. Such as the flammability index, its hazard 
hierarchy is classifed into four stages, i.e. “Low hazard”, 
“Moderate hazard”, “High hazard”, “Very high hazard”, 
based on flash point value of chemical material. Then 
membership function parameter can be calculated  
by boundary value of hierarchy classification in order  
to form fuzzy intervals for the index. 
As showed in Table 1, the classification of explosion 
index is based on the difference of UEL (Upper 
Explosive Limit) and LEL (Lower Explosive Limit), and 
the reactivity index is based on the standard of NFPA 
(National Fire Protection Association). Similarly, 
hazard hierarchy of other indices are classified into 
several levels. In temperature index, it is treated as more 
hazardous when the operation temperature is lower than -
30 °C. In pressure index, the operation in negative pressure 
is more hazardous than in atmospheric pressure.  
As showed in Table 2. The TOI index is classified 
into five levels based on LD50 data. LD50 data  
is converted to logarithm so that it is convenient to build 
fuzzy inference system. The TR index has different 
classification for gas, vapor, dust and mist, which types 
and parameters of MF are established respectively.  
The levels of TDE index is presented by Threshold Limit 
Value(TLV), which is also converted to logarithm. 
(2) Fuzzy inference system for each index is formed 
in Matlab. 
Since hazard hierarchy and MF parameter of index  
are determined, fuzzy inference system can be formed  
in Matlab. The type and parameter of MF decide the shape 
of curve of fuzzy interval. Based on data in Tables 1 & 2, 
fuzzy inference system for each index can be established 
by fuzzy logic toolbox in Matlab. Such as the temperature 
index, five fuzzy intervals and fuzzy inference surface 
made in Matlab is showed in Fig. 1. 
(3) Evaluation result of index is obtained by fuzzy 
inference system. 
Information of material and chemical process is input 
to fuzzy inference system, evaluation result of index  
is determined by fuzzy inference. For example, fuzzy 
evaluation of temperature index is showed in Fig. 2. 
Assuming reaction temperature is 200℃，its evaluation 
result is 0.3. 
 
Index Weighting 
The proposed method calculates index weighting 
according to AHP, which is suitable to the complex 
system of interrelated and mutual restrain. It provides 
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Table 1: Hazard hierarchy and membership functions parameter of safety indices. 
Index name Hazard hierarchy Hierarchy classification Type of MF Parameter of MF 
Flammability (Flash point) (℃) 
Low hazard ≥93.4 trapezoidal [65.6 93.4 ∞ ∞] 
Moderate hazard ≥37.8 triangular [30.3 65.6 93.4] 
High hazard ≥22.8 triangular [11.4 30.3 65.6] 
Very high hazard ＜22.8 trapezoidal [-40 -40 11.4 30.3] 
Explosion (U-L) 
Low hazard 0-20 trapezoidal [0 0 10 32.5] 
Moderate hazard 20-45 triangular [10 32.5 57.5] 
High hazard 45-70 triangular [32.5 57.5 85] 
Very high Hazard 70-100 trapezoidal [57.5 85 100 100] 
Reactivity (NFPA standard) 
Low hazard 0 trapezoidal [0 0 0.5 1.5] 
Moderate hazard 1 triangular [0.5 1.5 2.5] 
High hazard 2 triangular [1.5 2.5 3.5] 
Very high Hazard 3 trapezoidal [2.5 3.5 4 4] 
Reaction heat (J/g) 
Very Low hazard ≤200 trapezoidal [-∞ -∞ 100 400] 
Low hazard ＜600 triangular [100 400 900] 
Moderate hazard ＜1200 triangular [400 900 2100] 
High hazard ＜3000 triangular [900 2100 3000] 
Very high Hazard ≥3000 trapezoidal [2100 3000 +∞ +∞] 
Yield (%) 
Very Low hazard 80-100 trapezoidal [100 100 90 70] 
Low hazard 60-80 triangular [90 70 50] 
Moderate hazard 40-60 triangular [70 50 30] 
High hazard 20-40 triangular [50 30 10] 
Very high Hazard 0-20 trapezoidal [30 10 0 0] 
Temperature (℃) 
Moderate Hazard <-30 trapezoidal [-∞ -∞ -40 -20] 
Low hazard -30-70 triangular [-30 20 185] 
Moderate hazard 70-300 triangular [20 185 450] 
High hazard 300-600 triangular [185 450 600] 
Very high Hazard >600 trapezoidal [450 600 +∞ +∞] 
Pressure (bar) 
Low hazard 0-0.5 trapezoidal [0 0 0.25 1] 
Very Low hazard 0.5-5 triangular [0.25 2.75 15] 
Low hazard 5-25 triangular [2.75 15 37.5] 
Moderate hazard 25-50 triangular [15 37.5 125] 
High hazard 50-200 triangular [37.5 125 600] 
Very high Hazard 200-1000 trapezoidal [600 1000 +∞ +∞] 
 
MF: Membership Function 
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Table 2: Hazard hierarchy and membership functions parameter of health indices. 
Index name Hierarchy description 
Hierarchy 
classification 




Very Low hazard >=5000 >=3.70 trapezoidal [3.5 3.85 4 4] 
Low hazard 2000-5000 3.30-3.70 triangular [2.89 3.5 3.85] 
Moderate hazard 300-2000 2.48-3.30 triangular [1.89 2.89 3.5] 
High hazard 20-300 1.30-2.48 triangular [0.65 1.89 2.89] 




Very Low hazard ＞5000 >3.70 trapezoidal [3.55 4 5 5] 
Low hazard 2500-5000 3.40-3.70 triangular [3.05 3.55 4] 
Moderate hazard 500-2500 2.70-3.40 triangular [2.35 3.05 3.55] 
High hazard 100-500 2-2.70 triangular [1 2.35 3.05] 




Very Low hazard ＞20 - trapezoidal [15 25 30 30] 
Low hazard 10-20 - triangular [6 15 25] 
Moderate hazard 2-10 - triangular [1.25 6 15] 
High hazard 0.5-2 - triangular [0.25 1.25 6] 
Very high Hazard ≤0.5 - trapezoidal [0 0 0.25 1.25] 
TR-dust and mist 
(LC50) 
(mg/kg) 
Very Low hazard ＞5 - trapezoidal [3 7.5 10 10] 
Low hazard 1-5 - triangular [0.75 3 7.5] 
Moderate hazard 0.5-1 - triangular [0.275 0.75 3] 
High hazard 0.05-0.5 - triangular [0.025 0.275 0.75] 




Very Low hazard >=10000 >=4 trapezoidal [3 5 6 6] 
Low hazard 100-10000 2-4 triangular [1.5 3 5] 
Moderate hazard 10-100 1-2 triangular [0.55 1.5 3] 
High hazard 1-10 0.1-1 triangular [0.055 0.55 1.5] 
Very high Hazard <=1 0-0.1 trapezoidal [0 0 0.055 0.55] 
 
a modeling approach to obtain the weightings of factors 
for the purpose to overcome the inconsistency in 
decision-making. The implementation of AHP is 
described in the following three steps. 
(1) Establishing hierarchical model. The complex 
issue is decomposed to the combination of interrelated 
elements. The elements are classified to different stages 
according to their properties and relationships, forming 
the hierarchical model including maximum layer, 
intermediate layer and the bottom layer generally. The 
element in upper layer dominates all elements in adjacent 
lower layer.  
In proposed method, the hierarchical model is showed 
in Fig. 3. The objective layer has an element which is  
the safety index, dominating all elements in lower layer. 
The rule layer contains seven elements, which are the indices 
of flammability, explosion, reactivity, reaction heat, 
yield, temperature, pressure. The weightings obtained  
in the end represent the contributions of each element  
to safety index.  



























































C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
0      100    200    300    400    500    600    700    800    900   1000 
Input variable “TEMP” 





































Iran. J. Chem. Chem. Eng. Jiao W. & Xiang Sh. Vol. 35, No. 4, 2016 
 
160 
Table 3: Judgement matrix for rule layer. 
A B1 B2 
B1 1 2 
B2 1/2 1 
 
Table 4: Judgement matrix for B1 in sub-rule layer. 
B1 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
C1 1 1 2 2 4 3 3 
C2 1 1 2 2 4 3 3 
C3 1/2 1/2 1 1 3 2 2 
C4 1/2 1/2 1 1 3 2 2 
C5 1/4 1/4 1/3 1/3 1 1/2 1/2 
C6 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 2 1 1 
C7 1/3 1/3 1/2 1/2 2 1 1 
 
Table 5: Judgement matrix for B2 in sub-rule layer. 
B2 C8 C9 C10 
C8 1 1/3 1/4 
C9 3 1 1/3 
C10 4 3 1 
 
(2) Judgment matrix. Assuming to compare the 
impacts of n factors, expressed by X={x1, ..., xn},  
to a factor Z, judgment matrix A=(aij)nn is formed by  
the way of pairwise comparison. The aij called comparison 
factor is the comparison result between xi and xj. The larger of 
aij value represents xi has the greater impact on Z than xj. 
According to the hierarchical model, B1,B2 represent 
safety and health variable in rule layer. C1～C10 
represent flammability, explosion, reactivity, reaction 
heat, yield, temperature and pressure, TOI, TR, TDE 
respectively. Comparison factor is obtained by the way of 
pairwise comparison of above variables in the same layer. 
Consequently, judgment matrix of rule layer is established  
as showed in Table 3. Judgment matrix of for safety and 
health in sub rule layer is showed in Tables 4 & 5.  
The value of comparison factor is determined based on the 
priority of inherent safety principle which the index 
belongs to. In other words, the index in the higher stage 
of inherent safety principle has more contribution  
to inherent safety than the ones in the lower stage.  
i, j i, ji, j 2 2 7 7 3 3
A B , B1 C , B2 C
  
           
           (1) 
(3) Determination of weighting vector and 
consistency test. For judgment matrix, the eigenvector W 
can be calculated by substituting the three judgment 
matrixs in Equation (1) into Equation (2) respectively, 
which is the weighting vector for the maximum 
eigenvalue max after being standardized. The weighting 
vector expresses the order of importance of the n factors. 
Consistency test aims to eliminate the inconsistency 
among the factors by calculating the consistency ratio.  
It indicates high consistency when the consistency ratio is 
less than 0.1. 
maxAW W                                                                  (2) 
The weighting vector and consistency test result are 
showed in Table 6. The vector k is the weightings of 
safety and health indices in rule layer. Vector of f1 and f2 
refer to the weightings of C1-C7 and C8-C10 indices 
Iran. J. Chem. Chem. Eng. Quantitative Safety and Health Assessment ... Vol. 35, No. 4, 2016 
 
161 
Table 6: Weighting vector and coincidence ratio of rule stage. 
Layer Weighting vector Consistency ratio 
Rule layer (B1,B2) k =[0.6667,0.3333] 0 
Sub-rule layer (C1-C7) f1 =[0.2501, 0.2501, 0.1437, 0.1437, 0.0500, 0.0813, 0.0813] 0.0060 





















Fig. 4: Assessment procedure of proposed method. 
 
in sub-rule layer respectively. The consistency ratio is 




The assessment procedure is showed in Fig. 4. 
Inputing chemical and operation information, values of 
safety and health indices can be evaluated by fuzzy 
inference system. Then, safety and health indices 
weightings are obtained by AHP method. Finally,  
the total inherent safety index value can be calculated by 
the eqations (3)-(5). In the equations, ITotal means the total 
index value. IS, IH refer to safety and health index value 
respectively. k1, k2 mean elements in vector k . Similarly, 
f1i means elements in vector f1 and f2j means elements  
in vector f2. IC,i refers to index in sub-rule layer C. 


















                                                               (5) 
 
APPLICATION AND DISCUSSION 
The proposed IPI is applied to assess nine routes for 
manufacturing acetic acid as a case study. The details of 
the nine process routes are presented by Palaniappan 
[7,16], showed in Table 7. 
The properties of all chemicals in above nine process 
routes are showed in Table 8, which are from MSDS and 
International Chemical Safety Cards (ICSCs) database [37]. 
LC50 data is converted to standard value with 2 hour 
exposure time by the equation (4) and (5). 
For gas or vapor, 
 
  The total index value
Chemical and process information
Fuzzy inference system
AHP method
Determination of safety index value
Determination of health index value C,8 ,10CI I
,1 ,7C CI I
Weighting vector of rule layer
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Table 7: Information of acetic acid process routes. 













Halcon vapor phase 
oxidation 
Ethylene+oxygen→acetic acid 215-250 60 Vapor 10-20 6.374 
2 Ethylene oxidation Ethylene+oxygen→acetic acid 150 80 Vapor 4.5 6.374 








Acetaldehyde+oxygen→acetic acid 60-80 95 Liquid 3-10 4.528 
6 Ethane oxidation Ethane+oxygen→acetic acid+water 150-450 25 Gas 15-30 9.809 








Methanol+carbon monoxid→acetic acid 250 99 Liquid 700 1.532 
 




















Ethylene C2H4 33 -104 <-40 2 - 420000(2h) 420000 200 
Butane C4H10 6.6 -0.5 -60 0 - 658000 (4h) 465346 1000 
Butylene C4H8 8.4 -6 <-40 0 - 420000(2h) 420000 200 
Formic acid HCOOH 33 101 69 0 1100 15000(15min) 42430 5 
Acetaldehyde CH3CHO 5.6 20.2 -38 2 1930 37000(0.5h) 74000 200 




15.7 79 13 0 7060 37620(10h) 16820 1000 
Methanol CH3OH 39.5 65 12 0 5628 83776(4h) 59250 200 
Carbon 
monoxide 
CO 61.7 -191.4 <-50 0 - 2069(4h) 1460 25 
 
1/2LC50(2[h]) LC50(x[h]) (x / 2)                              (4) 
For mist or dust, 
LC50(2[h]) LC50(x[h]) (x / 2)                                 (5) 
The data of these chemicals are input into the 
developed fuzzy inference system to obtain the special 
index value. All chemicals in each process route are 
assessed respectively, the highest index value of which  
is treated as the end value of this route. The index IS value 
is calculated by Equation (2), and the index IH value  
is calculated by Equation (3). Finally, the total index value 
ITotal is obtained by Equation (1). Assessment results of  
the nine acetic acid process routes are showed in Table 9, 
which are ranked as showed in Fig. 5. 
From the row of Table 9, it can be concluded that 
ethanol oxidation route is the inherently safer route, 
which has the lowest value 0.368. Huels butene oxidation 
route is the most hazardous one, which has the highest 
value 0.521. Comparing the IC,1 value, it shows that all 
process routes have flammability hazard, because nearly 
all chemicals have very lower flashing point. Similarly, 
the value of IC,4 indicates these process routes have highly 
reaction heat hazard, and the value of IC,9 reveals the 
process route has highly respiratory toxicity hazard when 
hazardous vapor is leaked in processing. By comparing 
special single index value, process routes can be ranked 
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Table 9: Assessment result for acetic acid process routes. 
Process route IC,1 IC,2 IC,3 IC,4 IC,5 IC,6 IC,7 IC,8 IC,9 IC,10 IS IH ITotal 
Halcon vapor phase 
oxidation 
0.920 0.269 0.500 0.920 0.375 0.397 0.316 0 0.648 0.368 0.578  0.400  0.519 
Ethylene oxidation 0.920 0.269 0.500 0.920 0.218 0.163 0.142 0 0.648 0.368 0.537  0.400  0.491 
Butane oxidation 0.920 0.094 0.080 0.920 0.241 0.198 0.563 0 0.634 0.250 0.471  0.325  0.422 
Huels butene oxidation 0.920 0.269 0.080 0.920 0.560 0.370 0.409 0.429 0.648 0.701 0.532  0.499  0.521 
Acetaldehyde oxidation 0.920 0.094 0.500 0.920 0.080 0.233 0.228 0.343 0 0.368 0.499  0.287  0.428 
Ethane oxidation 0.920 0.094 0.080 0.920 0.759 0.750 0.409 0 0.634 0.250 0.529  0.325  0.461 
Ethanol oxidation 0.879 0.174 0.080 0.920 0.080 0.207 0.128 0.080 0 0.250 0.438  0.228  0.368 
Low-pressure carbonylation 0.920 0.754 0.080 0.630 0 0.198 0.250 0.181 0.920 0.368 0.557  0.267  0.460 














Fig. 5: Ranking of acetic acid process routes. 
 
in the order of safety level, such as IC,6 index, Ethane 
oxidation is the most hazardous one. These routes has 
lower hazard for Halcon vapor phase oxidation, Huels 
butene oxidation, High-pressure carbonylation. Others, 
i.e. Butane oxidation, Acetaldehyde oxidation, Ethanol 
oxidation, Low-pressure carbonylation have more 
moderate and closely reaction temperature. Finally, 
Ethylene oxidation has the most safety process temperature. 
In the same way, process routes can be ranked just by  
IS or IH value alone. Besides the comparison in sub-index 
is convenient to indentify hazard and take measure  
to develop inherently safety process, the total index  
value ITotal is relatively objective conclusion to help 
decision-making. 
As Table 9 showed, all index values in applied 
assessments are normalized into [0,1], and its accuracy is 
0.001, which has higher precision in assessment result. 
The main factors which may lead to error in assessment 
result is analized as follow. During evaluation process, 
the most important points to obtain accurate calculation 
result are evaluation result of fuzzy inference system and 
index weighting by AHP. In the fuzzy inference aspect, 
hierarchic classification and fuzzy intervals of index have 
strong effect on evaluation result. However, if they 
change in a small range, the effect on evaluation result 
can be negligible. Moreover, since the curve in Fig. 1 is 
continuous, small changes of input value can not cause  
a major change in the results, which reduce the possibility 
of error. In the aspect of index weighting, determination 
of comparison factor in judgment matrix is an important 
influence factor. Although it is just based on inherent 
safety principles, value of comparison factor gived should 
meet the requirement of applied assessment. The result 
showed in Table 6 indicates that weighting vetor obtained 
by AHP has higher precision. 
The case studied involves similar chemicals and 
process condition in process routes, which challenge  
the discrimination ability of assessment method. The routes 
assessed here have different total index values, which 




Developing inherently safer process based on inherent 
safety guidewords in early stage always is better than 
adding on complicated and costly safety protection 
Acetic acid process routes 
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system in late stage. But all inherent safety guidewords 
are qualitative, not easy to be implemented and measured 
in design. Indexing method provides quantitative means 
to measure the level of inherent safety. The available 
methods have several disadvantages, especially the 
subjectivity in index interval and weighting. In this work, 
we provide a quantitative assessment approach to reveal 
both safety and health hazards in preliminary design 
Stage. The proposed method partly overcomes the 
shortcomings by effort in the following two aspects:  
(1) The uncertainty of assessment is reduced by  
the application of fuzzy method, which reduce  
the subjectivity of the determination of index value  
by applying fuzzy inference system. Meanwhile,  
the passive impact of medium variable in fuzzy inference 
is eliminated; (2) The index weighting is calculated by AHP 
considering index contribution in assessment procedure. 
Actually, The method has better extendibility of allowing 
user to add other indices according to the available 
information in different stage. The proposed method has 
been applied to acetic acid case study. The result 
demonstrates that it has good applicability, contributing 
to decision-making in early stage.  
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